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CHINA: A NEW RELATIONSHIP 
Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
Rocky Mountain College, Billings, Montana 
Monday, May 29, 1972, 9 :30a.m., M. S. T. 
I would like to shar e with you on this day which is 
of great Lmportance to you some thoughts of world affairs. One 
aspect of this subject, in particular, begs for your understanding 
and attention. That is the r elationshi p between the United States 
and China. It is upper most in my mind, at this time, because I 
have only this month returned from a journey to Peking. The 
'mpress ions of the visit to that capital and several other Chinese 
cities a re still very vivid . So, too, are my discuss ions with 
leaders of the People' s Republic . 
This is a notable year in U. S.-Chi na r elations . The 
fi rst significant steps i n 25 years have been taken towards a 
general revision of dealings with Chi na . The initiative was 
long overdue and, hence the backlog of unfi nished business is 
very heavy. 
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Almost a quarter of a century ago, we cut ourse lves 
off, as a matter of de l~berate policy, from all norma l relations 
wi th the largest nation on earth. We did so by misreading or 
d i stort i ng, in an official sense> the implicat·ons of the Chinese 
revolut ion which brought a new government to Peking in 1949 . 
Thereafter, we acted on the legal pretense that the Peo ple's 
Republic of China did not exi st. Even as we pretended it was not 
there, we invested heavily in an elaborate system of costly con-
stra i nts to curtail that government. 
The price of this detachment from reality was not 
trivial. Quite apart from billions spent for counterpoises to 
China throughout Asia, our present involvement i n Viet Nam can 
be considered, in large measure, to be part of the pr i ce of this 
constra i nt. So, too, was our earlier i nvolvement in Korea. 
These and other military actions were undertaken in the 
name of a policy called "containment " which was based on a set of 
assumptions about the nature of events i n China, as we guessed or 
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persuaded ourselves to believe them to be. These assumptions were 
made 'n a vacuum because of our isolation from the Chinese mainland. 
Not surprisingly, many of them turned out to be highly inaccurate . 
The tragic cost of the miscalculations can be stated 
in terms of the lives lost, the bodies maimed and the resources 
squandered all around the rimlands of Asia, particularly in Korea 
and Indochina. To be sure, we cannot est~mate what the alternat·ve 
costs might have been had we acted on more accurate assumptions, 
or had we taken no action at all. Simply on the basis of what 
did happen, however, history may well record these miscalculations 
regarding China, as among the most costl y of all time . 
I might say, parenthetically, that we are at a crucial 
point, at the present time, in determining whether we will pers ist 
in this mistaken course. I refer to events i n VietNam during 
the past few weeks. The new U. S. air and sea actions are vestigial 
responses wh~ch arise from the old , not the new China policy which 
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was signaled by the President's visit to Peking . Whatever the 
success of these new war measures, they wil l not alter in any 
way the overwhelming need of this nati on to disengage completely 
from the Indochina conflict . We need to do so, not to satisfy 
Hanoi or Peking or Moscow, but in order to serve our own national 
interests . If we have learned anything to date from thi s conflict, 
it is that we have no national stake in that conflict except an 
end to further casualties and the return of the orisoners of war 
and the missing in action. The course 0f action best calculated 
to serve these nat i onal needs remains to negotiate the best poli-
tical solution without further recourse to arms and to get out of 
Indochina, lock, stock and barrel . 
But, to return to the central theme of my remarks, it 
is revealing t o ask ourselves how we became involved in Viet Nam 
i n the first place . How did we permit ourselves to make such 
faulty commitments with such disastrous consequences? We get 
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some clues, I think, when we revi ew the spectrum of our relation-
ship with China over the last two centuries . 
More than with other nations, our relationship with 
Chi na has been subject t J the ebb and flow of popular myth. We 
have tended to oscillate from one overs implified view of China 
t o another . For almost two centuri es, China has been viewed , 
alternately, as benign or virulent, friendly or host ile, wise 
or foolish. 
Like the "yin" and "yang '' of Chi nese cosmology which 
holds that life i s the product of a dualism of o pposites, our 
image of China has gone from one extreme to the other . On the 
one hand, there has been the image of the China of wi sdom , intel-
ligence, i ndustry, piety, stoicism and strength . That is the 
benign China of Marco Polo and Pearl S. Buck; i t i s the China of 
the Charlie Chan movies and of the stor i es of heroic res i stance 
to Jaoan in the 1930's . 
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On the other hand, there has been the image of the 
Ch'na of cruelty, barbarism, violence, and faceless hordes. 
This is the China of drum-head trials, opium dens, bandits, 
summary executions, Fu Manchu, and the Boxer Rebellion. 
In the late 18th century, we looked up to China as an 
ancient civilization-- super ior in many aspects of technology, 
culture, and social order and surrounded by an air of splendid 
and imper~al mystery . In that period, the China trade was sought 
eagerly by the Clipper ships and Chinese produce was h'ghly valued 
notably along the Eastern Seaboard and in Europe. 
Respect turned to contempt, however, with China's 
quick defeat in the OpiQm War of 1840. There followed acts of 
humiliation of China such as our participation in extra-territorial 
treaty rights and the Chinese Exclusion Act of the last half of 
the 19th century. 
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In theearly 2Jth century, attitudes sh:fted again t~ 
benevolence. American missionaries of many faiths made China 
a favored f'eld for proselytizing and educat ion . In this per~od, 
the Chinese became, for this nation, a guided, guarded, and adored 
people. 
Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion in 1937 
produced another shift from benevolence to admirat5.on. At the 
end of the Second World War, admiration was displaced by dis-
appointment and frustati~n, as the wart ime truce between Nationalist 
and Communist forces collapsed in internal strife. This nation 
became profoundly disenchanted with China, a d i senchantment which 
was replaced abruptly in 1949 by hostil i ty . U. S. Secretaries of 
State turned their backs on Chinese leaders and spoke of the mehace 
of 11 Chinese hordes 11 as predecessors had spoken with similar re-
vulsion of the 11 yellow peril . 11 
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The hostility was la rgely a react· n, of c · urse, to 
the coming to power of a Communist regime on the Chi nese ma~nland . 
We were not only d'smayed by this development, we saw it almost 
as a national affront . Peking was viewed as a treacherous ex-
tens ion of the Soviet steamroller whi ch had reduced Eastern and 
Central Europe to subser vience at the end of World War II . China 
became in our eyes the Eastern puppet of world communism, to be 
manipulated by strings pulled i n Moscow . 
After Chi nese forces intervened in the war in Korea 
where, incidentally, Mao Tse- tung lost h: s eldest son, U. s . 
policy was cast anew on the premise that the government on the 
Chi nese mainland was an aggr essor . It was seen as ready to use 
force to impose inter national Communism anywhere in Asia . Con-
versely, it was assumed t hat if the endorsement of the free nations 
were wi thheld, this r egi me whi ch was sa i d to be "alien" to the 
Chinese people would wither and collapse. 
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On this premise, i t was rationalized that recognition 
must not be extended to Peki ng. Instead, the official Ameri can 
view was that the Chi nese Nat ional Government, whi ch had retreated 
to the island of Taiwan, continued to speak for all of China. We 
cut off trade with the Chinese mainland and di d whatever coul d be 
done to encourage other countri es to fol l ow suit. In a similar 
fashion, a diplomatic campaign was conducted year after year 
against the seat i ng of the Chi nese People's Republic i n the United 
Nations. 
We drew an arc of military alliances on the seaward 
side of China a nd undergirded them with the deployment of mass i ve 
U. S. military power in bases throughout the Western Paci f i c. Tens 
of billions of dollars were expended i n this process. Much of 
this immense outpour i ng of effort and money seems incredible now 
in the light of the Pres i dent's recent v i sits to Peking and t o 
Moscow . Yet, it has conti nued for 20 years and, of course, is 
still going on, notably, in Indochina. 
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As has been suggested, this last quarter century of 
China policy has been characterized by delusion and miscalculat ion . 
We assumed, for example, that the Chinese Communists would be unabl e 
to govern. We assumed that the Peking government would be an ex-
tension of Soviet Communism and a will ing accomplice to Soviet 
purpose and design. And we assumed that the Chinese government 
would be bent on territorial aggrandizement. 
All of these assumptions have proved to be erroneous. 
In the first place, of the numerous divisions which have arisen 
within the Communist wor l d, the differences between Moscow and 
Peking have been the most significant. They so remain today 
although the rasping edges of the conflict appear somewhat tempered 
by the periodic flare -ups of the war in Viet Nam. 
At the same time, the government of the People's Republic 
has not only survived, it has ~rovided the Chinese people with 
effective leadership . Chinese society has achieved a considerable 
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degree of economic, scientific and social progress. A modern 
technology has been developed which is sophisticated enough to 
turn out products ranging from needles and hand- tools to thermo-
nuclear devices, earth satel lites and the rockets to place them 
in orbit . A powerful national momentum has been generated which 
is proving sufficient to supply an enormous population with the 
wherewithal of decent survival and an improving livel ihood . 
Notwithstanding assumptions to the contrary, the Chinese 
government has not shown any great eagerness to use its own armed 
forces to soread its control abroad . Where Chinese armies have 
been employed they have been used to assert traditional territorial 
claims, or in express ion of concern for the safety of China's 
borders. China has not become enmeshed in foreign military ad-
ventures. In Viet Nam, for example, the Chi nese military involve-
ment has been per ipheral . There is Chinese equipment i n South 
Viet Nam but there are no Chinese battal ions . In North Viet Nam 
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reports have ·ndicated the presence, from time to time, not of 
Chinese combat units, but of labor troops engaged in repa i ring 
bomb damage to roads, railroads, bri dges and the like . 
Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalayan 
frontier with India, are often cited as examples of militant 
Communist aggression. Neverthel ess, for centur jes , Tibet has 
been universally regarded as falling within China 's over-all 
boundaries . If the Peking government claims that Tibet belongs 
to Ch na, so, too, does the Chi nese Nat ~onal Government on Taiwan. 
India also acknowledges such to be the case and American policy 
has never officially recognized Tibet as other than Chinese 
territory. 
Even in Korea, the direct Chinese military involvement 
did not begi n until United Nat j ons forces approached China's 
borders. In any event, the last Chinese batallions left North 
Korea years ago. 
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Look:ng ahead, it would seem to me that Chinese energies 
and resources are going to be s~ preempted by internal needs over 
the next two decades that there is little likelihood that China 
could post a serious military danger t~ the United States even if 
that were the inclinat ion. 
The evidence , in short, is ample to dispel some of the 
most alarming assumptions on which our past policies have been 
based . Of course, there is an immense potential danger in China. 
There is also an immense potential danger in every other powerful 
nat;on i n a w~rld which has not yet learned how to maintain 
c•vilized survival in a nucl ear age except on the razor's edge . 
Insofar as Ch"na is concerned, the fundamental question for us 
is not so much whether it i s a danger, but whether our policies 
will act to alleviate or to exacerbate the danger. 
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In my judgment ~ these pol i cies can alleviate the danger 
only to the extent that they are based on premises that correspond 
more nearly to real·ties than has been the case in the past. It 
will serve no useful purpose to flail at windmills. Now that we 
have~ in 1972, at last penetrated the shroud of ~bscurity surround-
ing China~ there is reason to hope that our judgments and actions 
regarding China and Asia, henceforth, will be better informed . 
In th~s new phase of our relat:ons with China, we must 
beware, of course, that the old pendulum of myth does not now 
swing to the other extreme~ thereby creating a new image of China 
which is as unreal as the old. We must guard against becoming too 
enamoured of the splendors of a newly revived amity. Banquets 
and toasts and shark's fin soup do no t of themselves assure a new 
order of world affairs . 
To keep the pendulum in equilibrium in our current ap-
proach to China, it woul d be well to heed a rule laid down by 
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Lord Palmerst~n, the prime M·n·ster o~ Great Britain in the 
1860's, who declared : 
''We have no eternal allies, and we 
have no perpetual enemies. II 
Our experiences in postwar World War II rel3t~ons with Germany 
and Japan underscore this observation . 
We have not always been very astute about defining 
where our real interests lie . We have often tended to confuse 
them wjth fleeting and transitory images ~f friendliness or 
animosity . This is all too true in the case of China where, for 
25 years, we have been obsessed with the assumed threat of a per-
petual enemy. In fact, we might well have avoided the untold 
misery and loss of life and resources of the peripheral war in 
Indochina, had we forgone the poses of power and, instead, taken 
a harder view of our national interests . 
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While we cannot identify nationa l interests with exacti-
tude, we do have :t w:thin our means to determine much ~ore clearly 
where ~t is that they do not lie. The President has shown the way 
in th·.s connect:on . Even before his vi s i t to Peki ng, he had laid 
the groundwork for reestablishing more normal contact w:th the 
People's Republic of China by the removal of di scriminatory restr ic-
tion on travel of Americans to the Chinese mainland and by end ing 
the embargo on trade with China. The embargo had been imposed 
during the Korean War and was of a design so tight as to exclude 
even chop- sticks . The fact is , however, that for two decades, it 
had had no economic impact on Chi na and had served only to injure 
our own traders . By ending the boycott on the eve of his visit 
China 
to China, the Pres i dent removed what was, at most, an irr itant to I 
but which would have hampered his efforts to br i ng about the 
beginnings of a reconciliation. 
As i t was, Pres ident Nixon was able to l ay the groundwork 
for the growth of contact between the t wo nations. The chances 
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are good that the months and years ahead will see a gradual increase 
in exchanges between Chtna and the United States in med'cine and 
health, sc·ence, journal~sm, athletics, the arts and other pursuits. 
An increase in trade is also to be anticipated . The 
Chinese are 'n an excellent position to move forward in this connec-
tion. It has been their pract1ce to keep imports and exports, world-
wide, in rough balance . They have neither external nor interna l 
debt. They have ample exchange reserves . Their inter national re-
putat·on for integrity and reliability ·n commercial transatjons 
is already very good . A great range of ch·nese products is avail-
able for sale in the world markets and the Chinese also have a 
substantial shopping list for imports wh{ch will help to speed 
their own development and strengthen their economic self-reliance. 
Exchanges can take place, in my judgment, even though 
the issue of Taiwan remains, finally, to be resolved. President 
Nixon has acknowledged as valid, Peking's claim that the island 
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is part o~ Ch:na . That claim~ incidentally, is sustained by the 
Chinese government on Taiwan. With the assurance that the United 
States will not pursue a two-Ch~na policy, Pek·ng is prepared to 
go ahead ~n reestab 1 ishing contact w·th this nati~n wh"le exploring 
in its own fashion the road to reunif cat;on of the island with 
the mainland. 
Beyond exchanges between China and the United States, 
there loom larger ouestions of peace and security in the Western 
Pacific. Even as we meet here today~ weawait the consequences 
of the latest escalat5on of the U. S. involvement in Viet Nam as 
well as the full import of the Pres·dent's discussions in Moscow. 
One can only hope that we have seen the last resort to retaliation 
in Indochina~ the final burst of this wasting conflict and that 
progress can now be expected toward a genuine political settlement . 
In all candor~ the record of this tragic war provides 
little grounds for optimism in thjs resoect . The invas ·on of 
Cambodia d'd not produce peace. Nor d"d the invasion of Laos. 
Nor d'd the earlier bombing enterprises over North Viet Nam . 
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Peace was the prQmise attached, in turn, to each of 
these esca:at~~ns o~ the U. S. involvement . Each, in turn, led 
not to the oromised peace but to -.a more killed and maimed, more 
prisoners of war, more miss:ng in act ~on, more and more billions 
i n ex9end~tures to pr oduce mor e and more devastat~on throughout 
Indochina . 
The end of this war has yet to c~me and it is not clear 
yet when it will come . We would do we ~J. , nevertheless, to begin 
to examine the ooss · bilit'es of a new secur·ty system, based on 
the real :t~es of the 70 ' s . Those realit"es urge us to seek, in 
my judgment, an equ ilibr ium of this nation's i nterests with those 
of China, J aoan, the Soviet Union and the smaller nations of the 
Western Pacif"c. All have a stake in the peace of the regi on. 
The restoration of CQntact w·th Ch:na furthers the 
ooss·bil:ty tnat at some time tr:~a rt:te di scuss·ons might be 
held between China , J apan , and the Un jted States, if not quadri-
partite ta :~s, which would also include the Soviet UniQn. A 
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development of this kind could do much to allay unfounded mutual 
fears and to begin to come to grips with the question of adjustment 
of valid nat~onal interests. It could provide i ns ights i nto such 
vital questi)ns as the intentions of the various powers i n the 
Western Pacific and how they relate to one another, the economic 
needs of the Asian nations, and the prospects for curbing nuclear 
conflict . Most important, such discuss·ons might provide a vehicle 
for general stabilizat i on of the Indoch~na peninsula and Southeast 
Asia in the post-war era. 
Adjustments of this kind require fresh perspectives. 
We need t o see the situat i on as it is today, ndas it appeared 20 
years ago in the cataclysmic upheaval of the Chi nese revolution. 
We need to see the situation not through the fog of an old and 
stagnant host~lity but in the light of the endur ing interests of 
the United States i n the Western Pacific which are no less than a 
peace of equality and mutuality whlch will permi t a flower 1ng of 
relat >ons with all As ian nations. Nor, may I add, are they any 
more. 
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I see great re~evance in young men and women thinking 
deeoly of the ~ssues wh'ch d:v·de Ch'na and the United States to 
determine how they can be recast n new and uncluttered molds . 
Unli~e my generat~on, you have already learned much about Asia . 
You have a greater awareness of its 1 mportance to this nation 
and to the world . Fur ther more , you have not had the experience 
o~ nati~na1 trauma in moving abruptly fr~m an era marked by an 
almost ~awn·ng benevolence toward China to one of thorough d~s-
enchant~ent. You were s9ared the r~erce hostilities which rent 
this nat·on "nternally, as a sense of 1,o1armth, sympa"thy, and secur·ty 
regarding China gave way to fee1:ngs of revu'sion , hatred and in-
secur·ty . 
You young Amer icans and your counterparts in China wi.ll 
l "ve y~ur adult years in an era tn wh"ch much of the w~rld ' s 
h "story '.-;i.l' be \-Jritten 1n the Paci.fic . Wh1t y?u d~, how you 
relate to one another--Chinese and Amer·cans- -will have much to 
dJ w·th whether or n?t that h'story is wr:tten in terms of peace 
and c·vi.lized human survtval . 
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I have ~een Ch~na off and on since I served there in the 
Marines :n the 192~ 's. I have seen you, your parents and your 
grandparents much closer up and for a much longer per·od of time. 
I am confident about a future that be ongs to your 
generati~n, bJth in China and in this CJuntry of Jurs. This 
Republic is worthy of your best efforts not only in terms of 
developing ch·nese and U. S . relatiJns, but w ~th regard to the 
entire wJrld. You can do no more than try to achieve mutual 
understanding and a peace with all peoples . You can and should 
do no less . 
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When I think of Rocky Mountain College, I think not so much of 
your outstanding President, your excellent faculty, your spacious grounds, 
your fine reputation, or your student body, but of a young man whom I met 
years ago on my first vis it to this campus. 
His name was Dennis Casey. He came from Lewistown, Montana. 
He was the leader of the Rocky Mountain College Marching Band, which 
numbered thirteen on that occasion, a band which escorted me from the gate 
to the college. I was very proud on that occasion to be escorted by the 
nucleus of what later became a bigger - but not better - marching band, and 
very pleased to make the acquaintance of, and to be friends with, Dennis Casey. 
Since that time I have visited your campus on a number of occasions 
and every time I come here I think of Dennis Casey, who laid down his life 
in Vietnam, and who represented so much of what was good in Montana and our 
Republic. To me Dennis Casey is the symbol of all that is good, fine, and 
outstanding in this Institution, and when I speak of Dennis Casey, I am speaking of 
your President, your faculty, and your student body. He was a good man, he 
was a decent man, and I valued his friendship more than I can put into words . 
So, to a former student and a friend, may I, with your permission, 
dedicate this Commencement Address to Dennis Casey as well as to the Class 
of 1972? 
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